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Hospital water may serve as a reservoir of healthcare-associated pathogens, and contaminated water can lead to outbreaks and severe
infections. The clinical features of waterborne outbreaks and infections as well as prevention strategies and control measures are
reviewed. The common waterborne pathogens were bacteria, including Legionella and other gram-negative bacteria, and nontuber-
culous mycobacteria, although fungi and viruses were occasionally described. These pathogens caused a variety of infections, includ-
ing bacteremia and invasive and disseminated diseases, particularly among immunocompromised hosts and critically ill adults as
well as neonates. Waterborne outbreaks occurred in healthcare settings with emergence of new reported reservoirs, including elec-
tronic faucets (Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Legionella), decorative water wall fountains (Legionella), and heater-cooler devices used
in cardiac surgery (Mycobacterium chimaera). Advanced molecular techniques are useful for achieving a better understanding of
reservoirs and transmission pathways of waterborne pathogens. Developing prevention strategies based on water reservoirs provides
a practical approach for healthcare personnel.
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Hospital water and water-related devices as well as moist envi-
ronments and aqueous solutions can serve as a reservoir of wa-
terborne pathogens in healthcare settings [1, 2]. The hospital
environment may allow contamination by waterborne patho-
gens, in part because water temperatures are suitable for bacte-
rial growth, and the complex structure of hospital water systems
often leads to stagnation, corrosion, and biofilm formation [3].
A variety of water reservoirs have been linked to nosocomial
outbreaks including potable water, sinks, faucet aerators, show-
ers, tub immersion, toilets, dialysis water, ice and ice machines,
water baths, flower vases, eyewash stations, and dental-unit
water stations [4].Waterborne pathogens have included Legion-
ella, other gram-negative bacilli, nontuberculous mycobacteria
(NTM), fungi, protozoa, and viruses [3–5]. Transmission of
these pathogens from a water reservoir may occur by direct
and indirect contact, ingestion and aspiration of contaminated
water, or inhalation of aerosols [1, 2]. Waterborne outbreaks
caused by these pathogens and reservoirs have occurred
among patients in healthcare settings and have been a serious
threat to high-risk patients, especially critically ill patients and
immunocompromised hosts, leading to substantial morbidity
and mortality [3–5].
The aim of this review article was to (1) review healthcare-
associated outbreaks and infections associated with a water res-
ervoir from the published literature, and (2) provide infection
prevention strategies and control measures by water reservoirs
based on the published scientific evidence and available
guidelines.
SEARCH AND SELECTION CRITERIA FOR
REVIEWING THE LITERATURE
We searched the published literature via PubMed using the fol-
lowing Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) and keywords: (hos-
pital OR hospitals OR hospital units OR nursing homes OR
ambulatory care facilities OR ambulatory care OR dental facil-
ities OR assisted living facilities OR healthcare settings OR
patient) AND (waterborne pathogens OR Legionella OR
Legionnaires’ disease OR bacterial infections OR Mycobacteri-
um infections OR fungal infections OR mycoses OR protozoan
infections OR healthcare-acquired infection OR nosocomial OR
cross infection OR outbreak) AND (hospital water OR drinking
water OR potable water OR ice OR sink OR faucet OR faucet
aerator OR shower OR tub or toilet OR water fountain OR
water bath OR dialysis water OR decorative fountain OR ice
machine OR air conditioning OR heater-cooler unit OR water
microbiology OR disease reservoirs).
From January 1967 to July 2015, 2445 publications were
identified as a result of our search and were reduced to 1746
by filters of availability in English and abstracts. The 1189 ref-
erences (January 1997–July 2015) were screened using titles and
abstracts, then selected articles were carefully reviewed. For the
references published before 1997, we cited a previous review
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article [4] because of limited numbers of citable references. We
excluded articles without abstracts, non-English-language arti-
cles, articles that were unavailable in PubMed, reported cases of
contaminations or pseudo-outbreaks, and articles that did not
include human infections. We identified 179 references by
our initial screening process, and then prioritized listed cita-
tions to include at least 1 article from each reservoir and organ-
ism. Finally, 73 original articles [6–78] were selected and data
were retrieved for further analysis. Table 1 provides the features
of waterborne healthcare-associated outbreaks and infections
by each category, including author, publication year, reservoir,
organism, transmission, patient population, infection type, mo-
lecular typing, and study type.
HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED OUTBREAKS AND
INFECTIONS CAUSED BY WATERBORNE
PATHOGENS
A review of the literature revealed multiple outbreaks in health-
care facilities due to a variety of pathogens associated with
a water reservoir (Table 1). Infections included bloodstream
infections, pneumonia, and disseminated diseases (Table 1).
Patient populations at risk for waterborne outbreaks and infec-
tions included those with hematological and other malignancies
or stem cell transplants, immunocompromised patients, loca-
tion in an intensive care unit (ICU), premature infants in a neo-
natal intensive care unit (NICU), burn patients, and patients
during/after surgery (Table 1).
Causative pathogens included bacteria (Legionella, Pseudo-
monas, Acinetobacter, Serratia, Stenotrophomonas, Entero-
bacter, Klebsiella, Alcaligenes, Burkholderia, Chryseobacterium,
Elizabethkingia, Halomonas, Ochrobactrum, Sphingomonas,
NTM), fungi (Aspergillus, Mucor, Trichosporon, Fusarium,
Exophiala), and viruses (norovirus) (Table 1). Details of overall
waterborne pathogens in healthcare-associated infections [3, 5,
79–82], and specifically Legionella [83–86], Pseudomonas aeru-
ginosa [87, 88], Aspergillus [89], and NTM [90], have been pre-
viously reviewed. Legionella and NTM can reside in hospital
water distribution systems, while other gram-negative bacteria
and fungi can form biofilms [3, 79]. We briefly updated key
points from recent literature on healthcare-associated patho-
gens in waterborne outbreaks and infections as described below.
Legionella
Legionella can be detected in most water sources at low levels
[91]. The level of contamination of Legionella in hospital
water systems associated with disease remains unclear. A large
healthcare-associated Legionella outbreak occurred at a Penn-
sylvania hospital despite implementing a Legionella disinfection
program with a copper-silver ionization system of hospital
water [40]. In this outbreak, a link between clinical isolates of
Legionella and hospital environmental samples was confirmed
bymolecular typing, and Legionellawas viable and transmissible
despite the presence of copper and silver ion concentrations
within the manufacturer’s recommended range [40].
Multidrug-Resistant Gram-Negative Bacteria
As antimicrobial resistance in bacteria has become a global con-
cern, multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacteria (Klebsiella, En-
terobacter, Pseudomonas, Acinetobacter), including bacteria
producing extended-spectrum β-lactamases or carbapenemases
(eg, Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase [KPC] and New
Delhi metallo-β-lactamase), were described as waterborne path-
ogens causing healthcare-associated infections [19, 21, 22, 48,
50, 52, 54, 55, 57–59, 70, 71]. Multidrug-resistant organisms
were most commonly linked to contaminated sinks as a reser-
voir (Table 1). Notably, an outbreak of 6 infections due to KPC-
2–producing Klebsiella oxytoca in patients with hematological
malignancies was linked to contaminated handwashing sinks
[57].
Nontuberculous Mycobacteria
Our review found that a variety of NTM, including both rapid-
growing and slow-growing species, has led to waterborne
healthcare-associated outbreaks and infections as follows:
Mycobacterium abscessus with tap water, Mycobacterium
avium with potable water, Mycobacterium chelonae with ice
and ice machines, Mycobacterium chimaera with heater-cooler
units, Mycobacterium fortuitum with hospital water systems
and showers, Mycobacterium genavense with tap water, Myco-
bacterium mucogenicum with bathing and tub immersion,
electronic faucets, sinks, showers, and hospital water systems,
Mycobacterium neoaurum with hospital water systems, Myco-
bacterium phocaicum with showers, Mycobacterium porcinum
with ice and ice machines and tap water, and Mycobacterium
simiae with tap water [7, 13, 20, 27, 28, 31, 34, 35, 37, 41, 45,
51, 60, 62, 66]. NTM can be present in municipal water systems
and is relatively resistant to chlorination as well as being diffi-
cult to eradicate from contaminated water systems [3].
Fungi
Waterborne fungal outbreaks and infections occurred among
patients with hematological malignancies or stem cell trans-
plantation. Aspergillus can be detected from hospital water sam-
ples and has been reported to cause invasive aspergillosis [25, 43,
68, 89]. However, there are no criteria for contamination levels
of hospital water associated with fungal infections. Furthermore,
whether Aspergillus can cause waterborne healthcare-associated
infections via aerosols generated from contaminated hospital
water remains controversial [92]. Other fungal outbreaks associ-
ated with water reservoirs included Mucor with water-damaged
plaster, Trichosporon asahii with wash basins, Fusarium with
showers and sinks in a hospital water distribution system, and
Exophiala jeanselmei with deionized water from the hospital
pharmacy [11, 24, 74, 78].
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Table 1. Characteristics of Waterborne Outbreaks and Infections in Healthcare Settings, 1997 January–2015 June
Reservoir Organism(s) Transmission Patient Population Type of Infection Molecular Typing Study Type First Author, Year
Bathing and tub
immersion
(bathing tub
drain)
Pseudomonas aeruginosa Tub immersion water
contaminated from drain
when whirlpool bathtub
filled
Patients with hematological
malignancies (leukemia)
Bloodstream infection,
pneumonia, UTI
PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Berrouane, 2000 [6]
Bathing and tub
immersion
(showering)
Mycobacterium
mucogenicum
Water contamination of CVCs
during bathing or showering
BMT and oncology patients Bacteremia RAPD Outbreak – strong
causation
Kline, 2004 [7]
Bathing and tub
immersion
Legionella pneumophila 24 h bath water contaminated An elderly patient with dementia
admitted to a nursing home
Pneumonia PFGE Case report (single)
– strong
causation
Mineshita, 2005 [8]
Bathing and tub
immersion
(bathing
mattress)
Alcaligenes xylosoxidans Bathing procedures and
hydrotherapy in burn unit
Burn patients Cholecystitis, meningitis PFGE Case report (single)
– strong
causation
Fujioka, 2008 [9]
Decorative water
fountain
Legionella pneumophila Exposure to contaminated
water from decorative
fountain
Allogeneic stem cell transplant
patients
Pneumonia PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Palmore, 2009 [10]
Deionized water
from the hospital
pharmacy
Exophiala jeanselmei Contaminated deionized water
solution that was used to
prepare antiseptic solutions
Hematological malignancies Fungemia RAPD Outbreak – strong
causation
Nucci, 2002 [11]
Dialysis water
supply
Burkholderia cepacia Inadequate cleaning and a leak
in the reverse osmosis
tubing connection
Hemodialysis patients Bacteremia RAPD Outbreak – strong
causation
Souza, 2004 [12]
Electronic faucet Mycobacterium
mucogenicum
Exposure of CVC sites to
contaminated water during
bathing
Cancer patients (leukemia,
rhabdomyosarcoma,
neuroblastoma)
Catheter-associated BSI RAPD Outbreak – strong
causation
Livni, 2008 [13]
Electronic faucet Pseudomonas aeruginosa Contamination of outlet,
magnetic valve, and mixing
device of the electric faucets
Patients in NICU Bloodstream infection,
ventilator-associated
pneumonia
PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Yapicioglu, 2012 [14]
Faucet (aerator) Stenotrophomonas
maltophilia
Contaminated water after
aeration
Patients in surgical ICU Pneumonia, peritonitis,
bacteremia, UTI
PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Weber, 1999 [15]
Faucet Pseudomonas aeruginosa Contaminated faucets Patients in ICU P. aeruginosa infection PFGE Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Blanc, 2004 [16]
Faucet Nonfermentative gram-
negative bacilli (eg,
Chryseobacterium
meningosepticum)
Unknown Patients in ICU Nosocomial infections PFGE Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Wang, 2009 [17]
Faucet (outlet) Pseudomonas aeruginosa Potential transmission from
contaminated flow
straighteners in the water
outlets
Neonates in NICU Bacteremia VNTR Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Walker, 2014 [18]
Faucet (water-
saving device)
MDR-Pseudomonas
aeruginosa
Water-saving device (aerator) in
a staff hand basin and
biofilm in the basin’s
plumbing contaminated
Patients in high dependency
units
Nosocomial infection PFGE Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Inglis, 2010 [19]
Heater-cooler unit
for cardiac
surgery
Mycobacterium chimaera Airborne transmission from
contaminated heater-cooler
unit water tanks
Patients who received open-
chest heart surgery
Endocarditis, bloodstream
infection, vascular graft
infection
RAPD Outbreak – strong
causation
Sax, 2015 [20]
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Table 1 continued.
Reservoir Organism(s) Transmission Patient Population Type of Infection Molecular Typing Study Type First Author, Year
Hospital waste
water system
MDR Pseudomonas
aeruginosa
Contaminated hospital waste
water systems (sink,
shower, and toilet)
Patients in ICU and hematology
units
Bacteremia PFGE, VNTR Outbreak – strong
causation
Breathnach, 2012
[21]
Hospital waste
water system
IMP-type metallo-β-
lactamase-producing
Klebsiella oxytoca
Contaminated water Patients in medical and surgical
ICU
Bacteremia, ventilator-
associated pneumonia, UTI,
peritonitis
PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Vergara-Lopez, 2013
[22]
Hospital water
system
Legionella pneumophila Contaminated water supply Immunocompromised patients Pneumonia PFGE Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Rangel-Frausto,
1999 [23]
Hospital water
system
Fusarium Aerosols from showers and
sinks
Patients with leukemia,
neutropenia, BMT or stem cell
transplant
Invasive fusariosis RAPD, RFLP, IR-
PCR
Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Anaissie, 2001 [24]
Hospital water
system
Aspergillus fumigatus Unknown BMT patients Invasive pulmonary
aspergillosis
AFLP Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Warris, 2003 [25]
Hospital water
system
Amoeba-associated bacteria
(mainly Legionella anisa,
Bosea massiliensis)
Unknown Patients receiving mechanical
ventilation in ICU
Ventilator-associated
pneumonia
Seroconversion Case series
(multiple)
La Scola, 2003 [26]
Hospital water
system
Mycobacterium avium
complex
Contaminated hospital hot
water system
Hospitalized patients NTM pulmonary disease PFGE Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Tobin-D’Angelo,
2004 [27]
Hospital water
system
NTM (Mycobacterium
mucogenicum,
Mycobacterium
neoaurum)
Exposure of CVC sites to
contaminated water during
showering
Patients with hematological
malignancies
Bacteremia NA Outbreak Baird, 2011 [28]
Hospital water
system
Rapidly growing
mycobacteria (eg,
Mycobacterium chelonae)
Contaminated water and ice
machines
Hematopoietic cell transplant
patients
Mycobacterial infection NA Outbreak Iroh Tam, 2014 [29]
Hospital water
system
Pseudomonas aeruginosa Contaminated water outlet and
shower hydrotherapy
Burn patients Nosocomial infection Whole-genome
sequencing
Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Quick, 2014 [30]
Hospital water
system
Mycobacterium fortuitum Contaminated shower water A postoperative patient with
breast cancer
Breast infection Repetitive
extragenic
palindromic PCR
Case report (single)
– strong
causation
Jaubert, 2015 [31]
Ice and ice machine Legionella pneumophila Microaspiration of ice or ice
water
A patient with interstitial
pneumonia and mechanical
ventilation treated with
steroids
Respiratory tract infection NA Case report (single) Graman, 1997 [32]
Ice and ice machine Enterobacter cloacae Contaminated ice used for
cardioplegia in cardiac
surgery
Patients who received coronary
artery bypass grafting
Postoperative wound infection PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Breathnach, 2006
[33]
Ice and icemachine/
tap water
Mycobacterium chelonae Application of contaminated
nonsterile ice to the skin
Patients after cosmetic dermal
filter injections at a plastic
surgery clinic
Cutaneous infection PFGE Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Rodriguez, 2013 [34]
Ice and icemachine/
tap water
Mycobacterium porcinum Contaminated water Patients with pulmonary disease
or extrapulmonary disease
Pulmonary infection, localized
abscess, infected port,
peritonitis
PFGE Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Brown-Elliott, 2011
[35]
Ice bath Pseudomonas fluorescens Contaminated ice bath used for
cardiac output infusion
Patients with cardiac diseases in
a CCU
Bacteremia PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Benito, 2012 [36]
Potable water Mycobacterium avium Contaminated water Patients with AIDS and non-
AIDS
Disseminated infection PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Aronson, 1999 [37]
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Table 1 continued.
Reservoir Organism(s) Transmission Patient Population Type of Infection Molecular Typing Study Type First Author, Year
Potable water Pseudomonas fluorescens Contaminated water dispenser
that supplied bottled water
in a BMT unit
Patients with hematological
malignancies
Nosocomial infection and
febrile neutropenia
RAPD, PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Wong, 2011 [38]
Potable water Stenotrophomonas
maltophilia
Contaminated drinking water of
the cooling unit in the ICU
kitchen and mouth care to
patients
Patients in ICU Pneumonia PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Guyot, 2013 [39]
Potable water Legionella pneumophila Unknown Patients with Legionnaires’
disease
Healthcare-associated
Legionnaires’ disease
Sequencing Outbreak – strong
causation
Demirjian, 2015 [40]
Shower Mycobacterium fortuitum Showerhead used by patients A neutropenic patient with
leukemia
Disseminated infection AP-PCR typing Case report (single)
– strong
causation
Kauppinen, 1999
[41]
Shower Pseudomonas aeruginosa Potential transmission via hand
shower contaminated
Patients in a BMT ward Bacteremia PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Lyytikainen, 2001
[42]
Shower (wall) Aspergillus Potential aerosolization of
fungal propagules
Patients in BMT units Aspergillosis RAPD Case report (single)
– strong
causation
Anaissie, 2002 [43]
Shower (hot water
supply)
Legionella spp (mainly
Legionella pneumophila)
Inhalation of shower aerosols Older people in nursing homes Pontiac fever NA Case series
(multiple)
Bauer, 2008 [44]
Shower Mycobacterium
mucogenicum,
Mycobacterium
phocaicum
Exposure to contaminated
water via hand shower
Oncology patients Catheter-associated BSI Repetitive element
PCR, RAPD,
PFGE
Outbreak – strong
causation
Cooksey, 2008 [45]
Shower Acinetobacter ursingii Unknown Immunocompetent pregnant
patients in an obstetrics ward
Bloodstream infection PFGE (unrelated) Case series
(multiple)
Horii, 2011 [46]
Sink Serratia marcescens Soap and soap bottles
contaminated
Infants in NICU Multiple (eye, respiratory,
blood, urine, wound,
rectum)
PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Archibald, 1997 [47]
Sink / Faucet MDR Pseudomonas
aeruginosa
Contamination of water basin
sinks and water taps
(potential)
Patients who received invasive
treatment (surgery, cancer
therapy)
Pneumonia, UTI PFGE Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Pitten, 2001 [48]
Sink Enterobacter Unknown Patients in ICU Pneumonia PFGE Case report (single)
– strong
causation
Wagenlehner, 2002
[49]
Sink (trap) MDR Acinetobacter
baumannii
Unknown Patients in medical/surgical ICU Respiratory tract infection,
ventilator-associated
pneumonia, bloodstream
infection, abscess, wound
infection
Restriction
endonuclease
analysis
Outbreak – strong
causation
La Forgia, 2010 [50]
Sink Mycobacterium
mucogenicum
Probable exposure when
intravenous medication was
prepared near the sink and
implanted ports were
accessed
Patients with sickle cell disease
in an outpatient clinic
Bloodstream infection Repetitive-
sequence-based
PCR
Outbreak – strong
causation
Ashraf, 2012 [51]
Sink KPC-producing Klebsiella
pneumoniae
Sinks contaminated from
waste water
Patients in surgical/medical ICU Bacteremia PFGE, MLST Outbreak – strong
causation
Tofteland, 2013 [52]
Sink Elizabethkingia
meningoseptica
Contaminated handwash sink
and water
Bedside hemodialysis patients
on mechanical ventilation in
ICU
Bacteremia, lower respiratory
tract infection, ventilator-
associated pneumonia
NA Case series
(multiple)
Ratnamani, 2013
[53]
Sink ESBL-producing
Enterobacter cloacae
Contaminated sink Patients in ICU Pneumonia AFLP Outbreak – strong
causation
Wolf, 2014 [54]
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Table 1 continued.
Reservoir Organism(s) Transmission Patient Population Type of Infection Molecular Typing Study Type First Author, Year
Sink GIM-producing
Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Inappropriate use of surface
areas around washbasins as
placement of clean items
Patients in a tertiary care hospital P. aeruginosa infection PFGE, MLST Outbreak – strong
causation
Wendel, 2015 [55]
Sink Pseudomonas aeruginosa Contaminated water from sink Infants in NICU Pneumonia Whole-genome
sequencing,
ERIC-PCR typing
Outbreak – strong
causation
Davis, 2015 [56]
Sink KPC-producing Klebsiella
oxytoca
Contaminated handwashing
sink
Patients with hematological
malignancies
Pneumonia, abdominal wall
abscess
Repetitive-
sequence-based
PCR, MLST
Outbreak – strong
causation
Leitner, 2015 [57]
Sink / Shower NDM-producing Klebsiella
pneumoniae
Interhospital transfer of
patients and contaminated
sink trap
Older or chronically ill patients K. pneumoniae infection PFGE, MLST Outbreak – strong
causation
Seara, 2015 [58]
Sink / Tap water MDR Pseudomonas
aeruginosa
Contaminated water or patient-
to-patient transmission
Patients in a neurosurgery ICU Multiple (urinary infection,
pneumonia, sinusitis)
PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Bert, 1998 [59]
Tap water Mycobacterium abscessus Inadequate sterilization of
surgical instruments
Postsurgical patients Wound infection NA Outbreak Chadha, 1998 [60]
Tap water Small round structured
viruses
Transient contamination of the
taps
Patients in a reeducation ward Gastroenteritis Sequencing Outbreak – strong
causation
Schvoerer, 1999 [61]
Tap water Mycobacterium genavense Ingestion of contaminated
water
HIV-infected patients treated
with HAART
Disseminated mycobacteriosis NA Case series
(multiple)
Hillebrand-
Haverkort, 1999
[62]
Tap water Ochrobactrum anthropi Unknown Immunocompromised patients
(leukemia) in hematology unit
Bacteremia PFGE (unrelated) Case series
(multiple)
Deliere, 2000 [63]
Tap water Chryseobacterium
(Flavobacterium)
meningosepticum
Contaminated sink drain and
biofilm inside the sink tap
Neonates in NICU Pneumonia, meningitis with
septicemia
PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Hoque, 2001 [64]
Tap water Sphingomonas paucimobilis Contaminated taps and
showers used in a
hematology ward
A neutropenic patient with
leukemia
Bacteremia RAPD Case report (single)
– strong
causation
Perola, 2002 [65]
Tap water Mycobacterium simiae Potential transmission via
showering
Pulmonary cancer, chronic
pulmonary disease
Pulmonary infection PFGE Outbreak – strong
causation
Conger, 2004 [66]
Tap water Burkholderia cepacia Alcohol skin antiseptic diluted
by contaminated tap water
that was applied to
intravenous catheter site
Patients with cardiovascular
disease or cancer
Bacteremia RFLP Outbreak – strong
causation
Nasser, 2004 [67]
Tap water Aspergillus flavus Contamination of hospital
environment (air, tap water,
surface)
Patients in BMTU, ICU, and
NICU
Invasive aspergillosis RAPD Case report (single)
– strong
causation
Ao, 2014 [68]
Tap water Pseudomonas aeruginosa Contaminated tap water Patients in ICU Nosocomial infection NA Case series
(multiple)
Venier, 2014 [69]
Tap water / Wash
basin
MDR Pseudomonas
aeruginosa
Contaminated water taps and
wash basins
Patients receiving mechanical
ventilation in ICU
Lower respiratory infection and
bloodstream infection
AFLP Outbreak – strong
causation
Bukholm, 2002 [70]
Toilet MDR Pseudomonas
aeruginosa
Potential cross transmission via
toilet brush
Hospitalized patients Nosocomial infection PFGE Case series
(multiple) –
strong causation
Kouda, 2011 [71]
Toilet / Shower Norovirus Possible transmission via hand
contact and contaminated
items within toilets and the
bedside environment
Hospitalized patients with
symptoms of gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis RT-PCR Case series
(multiple)
Morter, 2011 [72]
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RESERVOIRS AND TRANSMISSION ROUTES OF
WATERBORNE PATHOGENS AND INFECTION
PREVENTION STRATEGIES AGAINST WATERBORNE
OUTBREAKS IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS
All water with the exception of sterile water and filtered water is
contaminated with microbes (eg, potable water, tap water,
showers, and ice). In healthy persons, contact or ingestion of
such water rarely leads to infection. However, contact or inges-
tion of such water may cause infection in immunocompromised
persons or when applied to nonintact skin. Water-related reser-
voirs in healthcare settings during 1997–2015 were as follows:
bathing and tub immersion, decorative water fountains, deion-
ized water, dialysis water, electronic faucets, faucets, heater-
cooler units, hospital wastewater systems, hospital water
systems, ice and ice machines, ice baths, potable water, showers,
sinks, tap water, toilets, wash basins, water baths, water birth,
water-damaged plaster, and water-saving devices (Table 1).
Transmission routes were primarily direct contact with con-
taminated water and water-related devices/activities or inhala-
tion via aerosols generated from the contaminated water
(Table 1). Waterborne healthcare-associated outbreaks and
infections continue to occur and were mostly associated with
well-recognized water reservoirs as previously described [4].
Moreover, recent studies document electronic faucets (P. aeru-
ginosa, Legionella, M. mucogenicum) [13, 14, 93–95], decorative
water wall fountains (Legionella) [10, 91], and heater-cooler de-
vices used for cardiac surgery (M. chimaera) [20, 96] as water
reservoirs. Infection prevention and control measures by each
reservoir category are summarized in Table 2. The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has published recom-
mendations of infection prevention and management for hospi-
tal water [1, 2].
Potable Water, Tap Water, and Hospital Water Systems
Various healthcare-associated infections were linked to contam-
inated potable/tap water and hospital water systems, especially
among immunocompromised and severely ill patients [21–26,
28, 29, 37–39, 62–65, 68–70]. The common pathogens included
gram-negative bacilli (eg, Pseudomonas, Stenotrophomonas)
[21, 30, 38, 39, 69, 70], Legionella [23, 40], and NTM [27–29,
31, 37, 60, 62, 66]. Waterborne organisms may exist in potable
water at acceptable levels of coliform bacteria (<1 coliform bac-
terium/100 mL) [4]. Standards for potable water should adhere
to public health guidelines, and hot water temperature at the
outlet should be maintained at the highest temperature allow-
able [1, 2].
Sinks
Some studies demonstrated a transmission link between sinks
colonized with a pathogen and patients using molecular typing
methods [47–52, 54–59]. The most frequent pathogens associat-
ed with sinks were gram-negative bacilli (eg, Pseudomonas, Aci-
netobacter, Serratia), as gram-negative bacilli can survive in wetTa
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Table 2. Summary of Key Issues and Infection Prevention Strategies Against Waterborne Outbreaks by Major Water Reservoir in Healthcare Settings
Reservoir Key Issues Infection Prevention Strategies
Potable water, tap water,
and hospital water
systems
Potable water is not sterile, and pathogenic waterborne organisms
may exist in potable water at acceptable levels of coliform
bacteria (<1 coliform bacterium/100 mL).
Healthcare-associated outbreaks have been linked to
contaminated potable water.
Semicritical devices are often rinsed with potable water, which
may lead to contamination of the equipment and subsequent
healthcare-associated infections.
Common pathogens include nonenteric gram-negative bacilli (eg,
Pseudomonas aeruginosa), Legionella, NTM.
Follow public health guidelines.
Hot water temperature at the outlet at the highest temperature
allowable, preferably >51°C.
Water disruptions: post signs and do not drink tap water.
Maintain standards for potable water (<1 coliform bacterium/100
mL).
Rinse semicritical equipment with sterile water, filtered water, or
tap water followed by alcohol rinse.
Some experts have recommended periodic monitoring of water
samples for growth of Legionella.
Legionella eradication can be technically difficult, temporary, and
expensive.
Potential methods of eradication include filtration, ultraviolet,
ozonization, heat inactivation (>60°C), hyperchlorination, and
copper-silver ionization (>0.4 ppm and >0.04 ppm,
respectively).
Sinks Colonization of sinks with gram-negative bacilli has been reported.
Some studies demonstrate a transmission link between a
colonized sink and infected patients.
Some studies describe that multidrug-resistant gram-negative
bacilli are associated with contaminated sinks.
Gram-negative bacilli can survive wet environments, including
sinks, for a long time (>250 d)
Transmission can be caused by splashing of water droplet from
contaminated sinks to hands of healthcare personnel, followed
by transient colonization of hands.
Common pathogens include gram-negative bacilli (eg,
Pseudomonas, Acinetobacter, Serratia).
Use separate sinks for handwashing and disposal of contaminated
fluids.
Decontaminate or eliminate sinks as a reservoir if epidemic spread
of gram-negative bacteria via sinks is suspected.
Faucet aerators Faucet aerators may serve as a platform for accumulation of
waterborne pathogens.
Potential pathogens include Pseudomonas, Stenotrophomonas,
and Legionella.
Routine screening and disinfection or permanent removal of all
aerators are not warranted at present.
No precautions necessary at present.
For Legionella outbreaks, clean and disinfect faucet aerators in
high-risk patient areas periodically, or consider removing them
in the case of additional infections.
Showers Some outbreaks are linked to contaminated shower heads or
inhalation of aerosols.
Potential pathogens include Legionella, Pseudomonas, NTM,
group A Streptococcus, and Aspergillus.
Prohibit use of showers in neutropenic patients.
Control Legionella colonization of potable water.
Ice and ice machines Patients can acquire pathogens by sucking on ice, ingesting iced
drinks, or use of contaminated ices for cooling medical
procedure and patients’ skin.
Large outbreaks occurred when ice machines have become
contaminated and ice used for cooling drinking water.
Common pathogens include Pseudomonas, Enterobacter,
Legionella, NTM, and Cryptosporidium.
Do not handle ice by hand.
Do not store pharmaceuticals or medical solutions on ice for
consumption.
Use automatic dispenser rather than open chest storage
compartments in patient areas.
Clean and disinfect ice-storage chests regularly.
Meaningful microbial standards for ice and ice machines do not
exist.
Routine culturing of ice machines are not recommended.
A regular disinfection program for ice machines is recommended.
Eyewash stations Stationary and portable eyewash stations may not be used for
months or years.
The water source may stand in the incoming pipes at room
temperature for a long period.
Pathogens, including Pseudomonas, Legionella, amoebae, and
fungi, could be transmitted.
Use sterile water for eye flush or regularly (eg, monthly) flush
eyewash stations.
Dental-unit water systems Potable water usually supplies dental units.
Water delivered to dental devices (eg, dental handpieces and air/
water syringes) as well as dental unit water lines may be
contaminated.
Immunocompromised patients may be at risk for infection.
Pathogens, including Sphingomonas, Pseudomonas,
Acinetobacter, Legionella, and NTM, have been recovered from
water supplies in dental units.
Clean dental water systems.
Flush with water and disinfectant solution, or use of clean-water
systems that put sterile water into the dental unit.
Flush dental instruments with water and air for 20–30 sec from any
dental device connected to the dental water system that enters
the patient’s mouth (eg, handpieces).
Ensure that water in dental unit meets standards (<500 CFU/mL).
Dialysis water Excessive levels of gram-negative bacilli in the dialysate were
responsible for pyrogenic reactions in patients or bacteremia,
which was caused by bacteria or endotoxin entry into the blood
from the contaminated dialysate.
Follow AAMI standards for quality assurance performance of
dialysis devices.
Disinfect water distribution system on a regular basis.
Perform microbiological testing and endotoxin testing for water in
dialysis settings regularly.
Maintain dialysis water (input) <200 CFU/mL and dialysate (output)
<200 CFU/mL per CMS.
Water and ice baths Contaminated water baths were used to thaw or warm blood
products (fresh plasma, cryoprecipitate) or peritoneal dialysate
bottles, followed by contamination of the infusates occurred
during preparation.
Contaminated ice baths were used to cool syringes or bottles of
saline in measuring cardiac output.
Potential pathogens include Pseudomonas, Acinetobacter,
Burkholderia, Staphylococcus, and Ewingella.
Consider routine cleaning, disinfection, and changing of water in
water baths.
Add germicide to water bath or use plastic overwrap of blood
products and keep the surfaces dry.
Use sterile water in ice baths (or at room temperature) used for
thermodilution catheters.
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environments, including sinks, for a long time [4]. Sinks should
be decontaminated if epidemic spread of gram-negative bacteria
via sinks is suspected [4]. Further, multidrug-resistant gram-
negative bacilli have been linked to contaminated sinks and
healthcare-associated infections as stated above [48, 50, 52, 54,
55, 57–59]. Although hand hygiene is an essential precaution
against healthcare-associated infections in healthcare person-
nel, transmission from contaminated sinks to their hands dur-
ing hand washing can occur [3]. Separate sinks should be used
for handwashing and disposal of contaminated fluids [1, 4].
Showers
Healthcare-associated infections have been linked to use of con-
taminated showers or inhalation of aerosols by immunocom-
promised patients [41–43, 45]. Potential pathogens related to
showers were Legionella, Pseudomonas, NTM, and Aspergillus
[41–45]. The use of showers in immunocompromised patients
(eg, neutropenic patients) should be avoided [4].
Bathing and Tub Immersion
Tub immersion used in hospitals for physical hydrotherapy and
for cleaning of burn wounds can cause cross-transmission and
Table 2 continued.
Reservoir Key Issues Infection Prevention Strategies
Bathing, tub immersion,
and hydrotherapy
Tub immersion used in hospitals for physical hydrotherapy and for
cleaning of burn wounds can cause cross-transmission,
transmission from environmental reservoirs, or
autotransmission.
Skin infections such as folliculitis and cellulitis occurred related to
water immersion.
Water contamination of central venous catheters during bathing
was related to bloodstream infection.
Potential pathogens include Pseudomonas, Enterobacter,
Citrobacter, Acinetobacter, Legionella, Alcaligenes, and NTM.
Adhere strictly to proper disinfection of tub between patients.
Drain and clean tanks and tubs after use of each patient, and
disinfect surfaces and components according to the
manufacturer’s instructions.
Add disinfectant to the water: 15 ppm in small hydrotherapy tanks
and 2–5 ppm in whirlpools per CDC.
Disinfect after using tub liners.
Cover catheter sites with transparent occlusive dressing.
Toilets Transmission can be caused by aerosolization of fecal bacteria via
flushing or surface contamination by fecal bacteria.
Transmission could happen in healthcare facilities caring for
mentally or neurologically impaired patients, or children.
Potential pathogens include enteric bacteria, Pseudomonas,
Clostridium difficile, and norovirus.
Facilitate good handwashing practices.
Maintain clean surfaces with disinfectants.
Clean bowl with a scouring powder and a brush.
No reason to pour disinfectant into bowl.
Separate toilet bowl from clean hospital surfaces.
Flowers and vases Flower vases and potted plants are heavily colonized with potential
pathogens, including Acinetobacter, Klebsiella, Enterobacter,
Pseudomonas, Serratia, Burkholderia cepacia, Aeromonas
hydrophila, and Flavobacterium.
No healthcare-associated outbreaks directly linked to flower vases
or potted plants have been reported.
Prohibit fresh flowers and potted plants in the rooms of
immunocompromised and ICU patients.
Or add antimicrobial agent to vase water and disinfect vases after
use.
Electronic faucets Electronic faucets were likely to be contaminated by several
waterborne pathogens than handle-operated faucets.
Issues associatedwith electronic faucets include a longer distance
between the valve and the tap, resulting in a longer column of
stagnant, warm water, which favors production of biofilms;
reduced water flow; reduced flushing effect (growth favored);
valves and pipes made of plastic (enhances adhesion of P.
aeruginosa).
Electronic faucets need to be designed so that they do not
promote the growth of microorganisms.
No guideline (but some authors have recommended) to remove
electronic faucets from high-risk patient care areas [eg, BMTU]).
Some have recommended periodic monitoring of water samples
for growth of Legionella.
Decorative water wall
fountains
Legionella pneumonia cases associated with decorative water
fountain were reported.
There is an unacceptable risk in hospitals serving
immunocompromised patients (even with standard
maintenance and sanitizing methods).
Avoid installation, especially in healthcare facilities serving
immunocompromised patients or in areas caring for high-risk
patients.
Perform maintenance regularly and monitor water safety strictly
unless removed.
Heater-cooler units Healthcare-associated Mycobacterium chimaera outbreak due to
heater-cooler units during cardiac surgeries as a water source
has been recently reported.
Airborne transmission from contaminated heater-cooler unit water
tanks.
Ensure that heater-cooler units are safe and properly maintained
according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
Enhance vigilance for NTM infections in patients after cardiac
surgeries using heater-cooler devices.
If NTM infections are suspected, review microbiology database
(NTM-positive cultures) and medical records of surgical
procedures within several years after cardiac surgeries.
Miscellaneous Potential reservoirs include distilled water or containers (outbreaks
with Enterobacter cloacae and B. cepacia), wash basins
(Salmonella urbana infection, Trichosporon asahii infection,
Legionella pneumonia), intraaortic balloon pump (B. cepacia
bacteremia), humidifier water in ventilator systems
(Acremonium kiliense postoperative endophthalmitis), water
cooler (gastrointestinal illness), holy water (Acinetobacter
baumannii infection), deionized water (Exophiala jeanselmei
fungemia), water-damaged plaster (mucormycosis), water birth
(Legionella pneumonia), water-saving device (P. aeruginosa
infection), rinse water during endoscope reprocessing (gram-
negative bacteria).
Consider control measures based on risk assessment by each
reservoir when available.
The information used in this table is based on references in this review. The infection prevention and control section was updated from our previous review [4] and recommendations from CDC
and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee [1, 2].
Abbreviations: AAMI, Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation; BMTU, bone marrow transplant unit; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; CFU, colony-
forming unit; CMS, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; ICU, intensive care unit; NTM, nontuberculous mycobacteria; ppm, parts per million.
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transmission from environmental reservoirs [4].Water contam-
ination of central venous catheters during bathing was linked to
bloodstream infection [7]; therefore, catheter sites should be
covered with transparent occlusive dressing. Pathogens associat-
ed with bathing and tub immersion were Pseudomonas, Legion-
ella, Alcaligenes, and NTM [6–9]. Tubs should be drained and
cleaned after use of each patient, and strict adherence to proper
disinfection of tubs between patients is essential [1, 4].
Electronic Faucets
Electronic faucets have been introduced in healthcare facilities,
mainly to save water consumption and costs and avoid health-
care personnel’s hands from being contaminated by touching
the handle [93]. However, several studies have revealed that
water samples from electronic faucets were heavily or frequently
contaminated by P. aeruginosa and/or Legionella, compared
with handle-operated faucets [93–95], and a P. aeruginosa out-
break due to electronic faucets among immunocompromised
patients in a NICU has been reported [14]. Electronic faucets
are more likely to be colonized because of low amounts of
water flow, more favorable conditions for growth of waterborne
pathogens (temperature of about 35°C in the column; materials
made of rubber, plastic, and polyvinylchloride), and less flush-
ing. Although the degree of risk posed by electronic faucets has
not been quantified and there is no guideline for the water qual-
ity of electronic faucets, some authors have recommended mon-
itoring water samples periodically from electronic faucets as
well as removing electronic faucets from high-risk patient
areas (eg, stem cell transplant units), given the difficulty of de-
contamination even with hyperchlorination [14, 93–95].
Decorative Water Wall Fountains
Two immunocompromised patients were exposed to a decora-
tive water fountain in radiation oncology, which was heavily
contaminated despite standard maintenance and disinfection
(ozone generator, filter, and weekly cleaning), and developed
Legionella pneumonia [10]. Another study described laboratory-
confirmed Legionnaires’ disease (pneumonia) in 8 patients, 6 of
whom had exposure to a decorative fountain near the main hos-
pital entrance; high counts of Legionellawere detected from foam
materials on the fountain despite routine maintenance [91]. A
fountain’s water has a closed recirculating system that can stag-
nate, and the spraying function may generate aerosols [91]. The
results from both studies suggested that decorative water foun-
tains can pose a risk for transmission of waterborne pathogens
and should not be installed in healthcare facilities serving immu-
nocompromised patients, even with standard cleaning, disinfec-
tion, and maintenance; at a minimum, water safety should be
strictly monitored [10, 91].
Heater-Cooler Units
Heater-cooler devices are frequently used in cardiopulmonary
bypass during cardiac surgeries to warm and cool patients’
blood [97]. A M. chimaera outbreak associated with heater-
cooler units during cardiac surgeries as a water source has
been recently documented [20, 96]. Patient infections included
prosthetic valve endocarditis, bloodstream infection, and vascu-
lar graft infection. The transmission was potentially caused by
aerosols generated from stirred water in contaminated heater-
cooler unit water tanks. In a report of surgical site infections
due to Mycobacterium wolinskyi, a cold-air blaster and a self-
contained water system in a heater-cooler unit was identified
as a potential reservoir [98]. The CDC’s recommendations for
healthcare facilities are as follows: (1) ensure that heater-cooler
units are safe and properly maintained according to the manu-
facturer’s instructions; (2) enhance vigilance for NTM infec-
tions in patients after cardiac surgeries using heater-cooler
devices; and (3) if NTM infections are suspected, review micro-
biology data (NTM-positive cultures) and medical records of
surgical procedures within 4 years after cardiac surgeries [97].
The US Food and Drug Administration recommended the fol-
lowing maintenance of heater-cooler units: (1) use sterile water
or filtered water (≤0.22 µm) to rinse or fill water tanks or when
making ice for cooling patients during a surgical procedure
(avoid using tap water); (2) monitor cleaning, disinfection,
and maintenance for heater-cooler units regularly with written
documentations of the quality control program; and (3) avoid
using heater-cooler units with cloudiness or discoloration in
the fluid lines or circuits (http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm466963.htm).
WATER SAMPLING AND MOLECULAR STRAIN
TYPING IN OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION OF
WATERBORNE HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED
INFECTIONS
Infectious disease physicians and infection preventionists
should recognize the emergence of waterborne healthcare-
associated pathogens and the unusual change of these rates,
and begin an initial investigation if waterborne healthcare-
associated cases are suspected [3]. Microbiologic sampling can
be considered to enhance epidemiological investigations and to
develop infection prevention and control measures. Microbio-
logic water sampling is not routinely recommended, but can
be performed in the following situations: support of outbreak
investigations, research purposes, evaluation of a potentially
hazardous environmental situation, and quality assurance (eg,
biological monitoring of dialysis water or assessment of infec-
tion control measures) [1, 2]. Established water sampling meth-
ods (eg, volume, media, and incubation temperature) should be
utilized to ensure recovery of waterborne pathogens; water sam-
ples should be filtered before culturing when low counts are ex-
pected and large volumes are needed (>100 mL) [1].
Molecular typing has been increasingly applied to outbreak
investigations in healthcare settings, and the advantages as
well as disadvantages of molecular methods have been de-
scribed by other authors [99–101]. In our review, molecular
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typing methods used for waterborne healthcare-associated
pathogens when applicable were mostly pulsed-field gel electro-
phoresis, followed by random amplification of polymorphic
DNA (Table 1). Recent studies using whole-genome sequencing
demonstrated more powerful evidence of water reservoirs in
transmission dynamics of waterborne pathogens, including an
outbreak of P. aeruginosa (1 pneumonia/17 colonizations)
from contaminated water via sinks among infants in a NICU;
transmission of P. aeruginosa from contaminated water outlets
and a thermostatic mixer valve among burn patients receiving
hydrotherapy even in plumbing of a new hospital; and 2 health-
care-associated cases of pneumonia caused by Legionella pneu-
mophila serogroup 1 from a contaminated hospital water
distribution system [30, 56, 102]. Thus, whole-genome sequenc-
ing is now promising for genomic comparative analysis in in-
vestigations of waterborne healthcare-associated outbreaks
and can provide more accurate and informative strain typing
to assess the relatedness of pathogens isolated from clinical
and environmental water sources.
CONCLUSIONS
We reviewed waterborne healthcare-associated outbreaks and
infections and summarized current infection prevention and
control. With emergence of reservoirs and pathogens that
have been unrecognized so far, waterborne healthcare-associated
outbreaks and infections continue to occur and affect patients’
health and safety, underscoring the significant role of water as a
reservoir for healthcare-associated infections. Water contami-
nation can cause pseudo-outbreaks [3, 80] as well as out-
breaks/infections, both of which require substantial efforts
and resources for investigation and control. Waterborne health-
care-associated infections are preventable for some pathogens
and reservoirs, but eliminating contamination of waterborne
pathogens as natural inhabitants of water systems may be diffi-
cult in healthcare settings. It is essential for healthcare person-
nel to understand reservoirs and transmission pathways of
waterborne pathogens for developing prevention strategies
and control measures of healthcare-associated infections. Mul-
tiple approaches of engineering and hygiene measures as well as
surveillance and clinical management for hospital water can re-
duce the risk for contracting waterborne healthcare-associated
infections [3]. Advancement of pathogen identification and
molecular typing methods has enhanced outbreak investiga-
tions as well as provided better understanding of reservoirs
and transmission routes of waterborne pathogens. The safe
level of microbial water contamination, which would preclude
healthcare-associated infections for any waterborne patho-
gen in susceptible patients, remains to be determined. Further
scientific and practical evidence on hospital water reservoirs,
pathogens, and healthcare-associated infections is needed
to address unresolved issues on infection prevention and
control.
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